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I Introduction
What policies do oil exporting countries' governments
follow when faced with vast unexpected windfall
gains? What are the consequences for the non-oil
economies of such countries and what do they suggest
have been the main shortcomings of policy? This
article reviews the use made of windfall gains by a
sample of developing oil exporters over the period
1974-81, and assesses the effects of their respective
choices through 1984. By then the impact of the 'oil
slump' was becoming apparent so that both the
upswing and the downside of oil cycles can be
considered, at least to some extent.
If historical, political and institutional constraints are
assumed away, windfall gains represent Ricardian rent
which is uncommitted to any particular group or use.
They may therefore be allocated 'optimally', as
defined by some national or social welfare function,
both over time and across uses. Consequently they are
at least as valuable as any other income stream, and
possibly more so; they simply enlarge the sphere of
national choice. Although some model-based analyses
of oil exporters start from this perspective, experience
over the past 15 years has been far more complex. This
is mainly because of three factors.
First, the behaviour of world oil markets has been very
poorly predicted [Gately 1984]. So have been the
historically large swings in exchange rates, nominal
and real interest rates and OECD levels of economic
activity in the turbulent global environment since
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1972. The range of uncertainty faced by decision-
makers at macro and micro levels therefore widened at
the same time as exporters began to receive the
windfalls. Because economies do not respond
symmetrically to excess demand and supply (with the
latter being more costly because of unemployment)
excessively optimistic predictions of future levels of oil
income tend to be more costly than overly
conservative predictions.
Second, government is in its own right a pressure
group, whose interests may diverge from any
reasonable 'social' welfare function. Indeed, in most
countries government embodies competing groups,
each with its own agencies and interests, so that
decisions may not be consistent either across uses or
over time.
Third, despite an increasingly influential view against
a major public role in the development process, there
is still no consensus on the best way to 'sow the oil' to
establish a viable non-oil economy and to accelerate
non-oil growth - a major goal of most exporter
governments. It is far easier to point to the failures of
activist policies than to advocate specific measures of
this kind, yet some active developmental role is almost
forced upon oil exporting governments because they
dispose of much, possibly most, of their country's
investible surplus.
For all these reasons, the ideologies, institutions and
priorities of the pre-windfall period up to 1973 were to
have a major influence on how extra oil revenues were
used after that date. In practice, the windfalls did not
represent 'uncommitted' income, as they did in theory.
Their practical range of uses in any particular country
was therefore circumscribed. It is not even clear that
taking into account political constraints, they simply
widened the choice set; some options politically
acceptable under budgetary pressure can be unaccept-
able when resources are unimaginably abundant.
Table 1
The Use of Windfall Gains: 1974-81
(Base period 1970-72, percentages)
These points have important implications for the
'social value' of windfalls. If more resources do not
expand the choice set their value is no longer obviously
positive, even if they are perfectly foreseen. There is
also of course no presumption that an exporter will
fare better with windfalls in a stochastic environment
relative to a situation of no windfalls and a relatively
certain environment, since the costs of prediction
errors can outweigh the windfall benefits.
II The Windfalls and their Use: 1974-81
Gelb (1986) developed a method to measure the
windfalls and account for their uses through
decomposing the national accounts; the main results
are summarised in Table 1.
For a sample of six non-surplus developing countries
- Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad &
Tobago and Venezuela - the windfalls over 1974-78
from the quadrupling of oil prices averaged the
Unweighted mean. Consumption in Trinidad & Tobago is split in proportion to split for other countries.
equivalent of 22 per cent of non-mining GDP.2 Over
1979-81 they averaged 23 per cent from the redoubling
of oil prices. About one quarter was used to reduce
trade and current account deficits from unsustainable
levels; in the pre-windfall 'base' period 1970-72 deficits
had averaged 5.1 per cent of non-mining GDP for the
set of countries. Around one quarter was consumed,
half by government and half by the private sector. The
rest, almost one half, was invested domestically, but
the extra investment was entirely by government and
public enterprises.
Although deficits were reduced, none of the windfall
was saved abroad between 1974 and 1981. Surpluses in
1974-75 and in 1980 offset deficits in 1978 and 1981
which emerged as oil revenues slumped and
expenditures were not rapidly curtailed. Although
current accounts plus direct investment totalled only
All estimates are based on a breakdown of producer economies into
mining and non-mining, rather than oil and non-oil, components.
All windfalls and theïr uses are measured relative to the 'base
period' 1970-72.
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1974-78
Algeria Ecuador Indonesia Nigeria
Trinidad &
Tobago Venezuela Average
Windfall/non-mining
GDP 27 17 16 23 39 11 22
Use:
Reducing Trade Deficit -16 21 22 12 70 -9 25
Private Consumption 13 -5 13 13 18 18 10
Public Consumption 5 33 15 18 - 15 14
Private Investment 23 -11 -29 -7 31 3
Public Investment 97 29 50 86 19 45 53
1979-81
Windfall/non-mining
GDP 29.7 22.1 22.7 21.9 34.7 8.7 23
Use:
Reducing Trade Deficit 30 21 42 0 48 13 30
Private Consumption 15 5 5 19 25 108 18
Public Consumption 11 28 16 26 8 17
Private Investment 43 47 36 55 27 -29 36
$1.9 bn between 1974 and 1981 there was a rise in net
recorded foreign debt of $35.2 bn because of capital
outflows.3
Essentially then, the windfalls funded some inter-
national diversification of portfolios, some con-
sumption and much domestic public investment. On
average, about two thirds of this was directed towards
sectors conventionally considered as non-traded -
roads, ports, telecommunications, utilities and other
physical infrastructure and social investments in
health and education - and one third to exporting
and import-substituting sectors, notably large-scale
resource-based industrial projects - steel, aluminium,
methanol, urea, ammonia, piped gas, LNG and
refining.
The consequences of this pattern of absorption are
analysed below. Meanwhile, it is important to stress
the options which were not extensively adopted. There
was little saving abroad except in Trinidad & Tobago.
Windfalls were not redistributed to the private sector
to any great extent, either directly or by cutting non-oil
taxes, although subsidies of various kinds rose to a
significant share of budgetary spending, especially in
the richer exporters, Trinidad & Tobago and
Venezuela [Auty and Gelb 1984, Bourguignon 19851.
A further implicit subsidy to domestic energy users
resulted from widespread reluctance to raise prices of
oil derivatives to world levels. In several countries
government collected little or no revenue from oïl
produced for domestic use, and subsidies rose to the
equivalent of about five per cent of GDP before
shrinking fiscal revenues forced sharp increases in
energy prices in the early 1980s. As a result, consumer
prices rose less rapidly than investment prices or non-
mining output deflators, especially in the richer
countries in the sample, and real consumption levels
rose far more than indicated by the increases in value
shares relative to non-mining GDP, in Table 1.
Except in Indonesia where rural rehabilitation and the
need to raise output had been policy goals since the
start of the Suharto government, oil revenues were not
directed towards smallholder agriculture. In certain
countries agricultural spending did rise, but most went
for large public projects [for discussions of Nigeria
and Iran see Bienen 1983, Katouzian 1978 and
Jazayeri in this Bulletin] or as subsidies to failing state
enterprises [especially to sugar in Trinidad & Tobago;
Auty and Gelb 1984]. With the exception of the larger
public projects mentioned above, there were no major
attempts to strengthen export-oriented manufacturing.
The change in net recorded debt is defined as the change in medium
and long term debt less reserves plus the change in short term debt
over 1979-81. Certain capital exports such as international assets of
domestic oil companies are official though not counted as reserves,
but much capital outflow was unofficial.
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The sector typically remained weak, protected and
oriented towards domestic markets which grew
rapidly while public spending rose. Direct foreign
investment was disappointing. In some countries it
was discouraged by indigenisation policies which
aimed to expand the sphere of national control -
another common goal of oil exporting governments.
Finally, the windfalls were not used to effect major
improvements in administration and regulation,
though they offered a breathing space to carry out
such reforms. For example, a slight slackening of non-
oil tax effort in certain countries was not an irrational
response to rising oil revenues. But the countries failed
to take advantage of low revenue needs to put into
place tax systems capable of raising domestic revenues
more efficiently should oil revenues fall. One country,
Indonesia, did however implement a major tax reform
in 1984.
This broad summary should not obscure the very
considerable differences between countries. As shown
in Table 1 there were considerable variations in the
broad patterns of response, and there were con-
siderable differences in investment emphasis. Algeria
followed an exceptionally intensive heavy industrial
strategy and borrowed abroad against future export
revenue to help finance it; by 1977 its investment
programmes (90 per cent public) had reached the
remarkable level of 73 per cent of non-mining GDP.
Ecuador emphasised infrastructure, electrification
and education. Indonesia followed a relatively
balanced strategy with a unique emphasis on rural
reconstruction, irrigation and smallholder rice intensi-
fication. Nigeria first emphasised road-building and
education programmes, and later added steel plants
and a new Federal capital city. Trinidad & Tobago
sought to overcome an infrastructural backlog which
had developed in the late 1960s and also initiated a
diverse set of gas-based industrial projects while
saving much of its windfall abroad between 1974 and
1981. Venezuelan public investments emphasised
especially the metals industries, steel, aluminium and
their associated infrastructural needs. The country
also experienced large capital outflows.
These differences reflected, to a great extent, pre-
shock differences in institutions and a strong element
of inertia. The suddenness of the windfalls coupled
with a desire to absorb them rapidly led the volume of
public spending to change far more rapidly than
political systems or institutions. Large increases in
revenue therefore tended to be channelled into a
relatively narrow range of uses where rapid
disbursement was possible. But by the same token, oil
revenues were generally not applied in ways which
required politically difficult adjustments or lengthy
institutional development. To cite some examples,
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although the windfall offered Ecuador the resources to
effect a major land reform with compensation, this
objective was set aside in favour of limited
'colonisation' of new lands. Despite the impediment
that lack of an effective extension service posed for
agricultural growth in Nigeria, oil money did not flow
in this direction.
III Consequences of the Strategy: 1974-81
The theory of 'booming sector' economies [Corden
and Neary 1982] suggests that increased spending of
windfall gains will result in an appreciation of the real
exchange rate (an increase in the relative price of non-
traded goods), followed by a resource shift away from
the non-oil traded sectors and an increase in oil
dependence. In the longer run, factor intensity
differences or changes in efficiency caused by oil
financed investments may offset some of these effects.
If extra spending is largely invested, neoclassical
growth theory may be used to project the increase in
growth, assuming constant quality of capital
formation. Output may also respond to the pressure of
demand. On the upswing of the cycle the ability to do
so depends on the existence of spare capacity. On the
downside, the extent to which real output contracts in
response to falling demand or to supply shocks (such
as those emanating from increased input prices)
depends on the extent of real and nominal wage and
price rigidities or sluggishness [Kanbur 1984, Gelb
1985].
The experience of the oïl exporter sample from 1970-
84 is summarised in Figure 1, which shows growth
rates of non-mining GDP, inflation rates and real
effective exchange rates.4 All graphs show unweighted
averages for the six countries and real effective
exchange rates are shown separately for Indonesia and
Nigeria. Considering the period 1970-8 1 for the
moment, this may be divided into four phases:
1970-72: the end of recovery from the domestic
shocks of the mid-1960s (in Algeria, Nigeria and
Indonesia) which were responsible for an unusual
burst of growth. The average non-mining GDP
growth rate fell from over 10 per cent in 1970 to 5.3 per
cent in 1971 and 1972.
1972-77: the upswing of the first boom. Domestic
prices rose sharply and real exchange rates appreciated
as spending accelerated. Resources were reallocated
towards the non-tradeables, especially construction,
which grew at 13.9 per cent. This permitted a rise in
The real effective exchange rate is defined as the weighted average of
trading partners' price levels relative to domestic prices converted at
annual average exchange rates. It is used as a proxy for the real
exchange rate (defined as relative price of traded and non-traded
goods) because the latter is difficult to measure when goods display
a continuum of tradeability. The two measures can diverge if trade
policy changes.
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output in 1976 and 1977 and a fall in inflation.
1977-79: the downside of the first boom. As oil
income and spending slackened after 1977 fiscal policy
became less expansive. On the upswing of the boom
capacity constraints in the non-traded sectors had
limited the speed with which output could respond to
increased demand; the result was that real exchange
rates appreciated, deflecting demand onto rapidly
growing imports. As demand fell, real output and
capacity use contracted sharply, but inflation
accelerated slightly. This was partly a result of the
inflationary momentum which had built up in the
boom period. But it also reflected increased domestic
financing of public sector deficits which opened up as
oil revenues fell below even the moderating spending
levels. It was not possible to rapidly reallocate factors
from the non-traded sectors, where demand was
slackening, to the non-oil tradeables. This period
therefore provides the first indication of asymmetric
macroeconomic adjustment. By the start of the second
boom in 1979 growth was lower and inflation higher
than in 1972 and 1973, the start of the first boom.
1979-81: the second boom. This was far more
abrupt than the first and its impact was smaller.
Inflation rates remained almost unchanged as did
non-oil growth rates, with a slight acceleration only in
1980.
Over the period 1974-81 the average growth rate of
non-mining GDP was 6.7 per cent. This was lower
than in 1967-72 (7.3 per cent) but 0.9 per cent greater
than the average growth rate of oil importing
developing countries over the l960s. From Figure lit
is apparent, however, that 1977 marked the end of the
high growth phase, despite intensive domestic capital
formation which should have ensured continued rapid
growth through 1981. There were thus signs of a
disappointing supply-side impact from the accelerated
public investment programme.
To conclude this brief appraisal of the 1974-8 1 period,
consider the evolution of non-oil exports. These
stagnated or fell in all of the countries except Ecuador
(where there was modest overall growth and a shift
towards processed products) and Indonesia, which
maintained a strong export performance over a fairly
wide product front. It cannot be claimed that
Indonesia's trade regime was liberal; outside the
small-scale sector international transactions and
investments continued to be intensively regulated.
However, Indonesia was far more ready than the other
countries to adjust the non-oil exchange rate in
response to expected shortages of foreign exchange.
The Rupiah was devalued by 50 per cent in November
1978 and floated and devalued again as the second oil
boom came to an end. The periods of severe real
effective appreciation were limited, as shown in
Figure 1. Nigeria, to take a contrasting case,
responded to shrinking oil revenues by tightening
quantitative import controls so that the real effective
exchange rate of the Naira appreciated continuously.
This seriously reduced the incentive to export, and
also increased fiscal pressure on government by
reducing the domestic purchasing-power of oil
revenues.
IV The Oil Glut: 1981-84
The second oil shock had led to a combined current
account surplus of$l1.8 bn for the sample in 1980 and
an optimistic world scenario for oil exporters. Most
projections were of real increases in world oil prices of
the order of three per cent per year. But with
weakening energy demand in OECD countries, the
dollar value of exports fell by 22 per cent in the sample
countries in 1980-82. Imports, propelled by the second
burst of public spending, rose by 23 per cent, resulting
in a 1982 current deficit of $20 bn. Such a deficit could
not be financed in following years; contractionary
policies were implemented and it was cut to $7 bn by
1983. These policies included sharp reductions in
public spending (Indonesia cancelled or postponed
half of its projected heavy industrial investment
programme) and cuts in domestic subsidies, parti-
cularly to energy consumption, as countries took steps
to raise administered prices. Taking 1981 as the
reference point, the period 1982-84 saw an average fall
in the contribution of the mining sector equivalent to
eight per cent of non-mining GDP and a reduction in
foreign financing of one per cent. About three quarters
of this loss was reflected in cuts in investment
programmes; the remainder was absorbed equally by
decreases in public and private consumption relative
to non-mining GDP.
The combination of spending cuts, increases in
administered prices and, in several cases, increased
prices of imported intermediates because of exchange
rate adjustments subjected the exporting economies to
a combination of demand and supply shocks not
dissimilar to those which faced the oil importing
countries in the upswing of the cycle.5 Non-oil exports
could not expand rapidly enough to compensate for
their small base. Not unlike the oil importing countries
in earlier years, the exporters were propelled into
stagflation in 1983 and 1984, with negative growth as
shown in Figure 1 and rising unemployment. Ecuador,
Nigeria and Venezuela experienced foreign exchange
crises on the downside of the second oil shock.
Indonesia avoided crises by rapidly adjusting the
exchange rate and liberating interest controls.
Trinidad and Tobago had ample reserves and Algeria
Had domestic oil prices foliowed world prices in the exporting
countries they would have experienced pari of the snpply shock n
1974 and ¡979, as did importing countries.
a tightly controlled foreign exchange market and
growing gas exports.
The effect of this period was to lower still further the
average non-oil growth rate of the sample to only
4.7 per cent over 1974-84. This was 1.1 per cent /ower
than the average growth rate of developing countries
in the 1960s. Adverse terms of trade for oil were not
responsible; even in 1985 the purchasing power of oil
exports was far larger than it had been before 1974.
The main reason was the failure of public investments
to have an appreciable supply-side impact, a topic
addressed in the following section.
V Accounting for Supply Side Failure
As noted above, about two thirds of public investment
in the sample countries was directed towards the non-
traded sectors and consisted mostly of physical
infrastructure and social spending. Such expenditures
had some notable effects. In 1970 the primary
enrolment ratio for the sample had averaged 0.79, well
below the corresponding ratio for middle income
countries (0.88)6; by 1982 the shortfall had been made
good and universal primary education was almost
achieved. Population per nursing person fell from
3,000 to 1,200; infant mortality declined by a third.
Nevertheless, investment in the non-traded sectors did
not provide an autonomous source of income to
supplement falling oil revenues; its supply-side
contribution was only 'permissive' of other activities.
Therefore attention focuses on the large scale
industrial investments which were a major part of
Government's assumption of an entrepreneurial role
in all of the sample countries except Ecuador. Such
investments: (a) are visible, (b) can absorb large sums
rapidly, (e) have a high import content so that there is
less pressure on domestic sectors, (d) are a source of
patronage (sheltered employment for supporters,
kickbacks from contractors), (e) promise loan capital
via suppliers' credits, and (f) promise export
diversification out of oil without requiring the
politically hard choices which go along with
restructuring the rest of the manufacturing sector.
Therefore they were favoured by producer govern-
ments. Many devoted the equivalent of one or two
years' total oil exports to such projects; some, like
Algeria, devoted more.
Although it has not been possible to make a detailed
quantitative assessment of rates of return, overall
performance appears to have been very poor. The
reasons for this have been studied by Auty (1986); this
section draws heavily on his conclusions.
All averages for the sample are unweighted averages of country
ratios.
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The most important factor in the poor performance of
public industrial investments has been the downturn
in world markets for many of their products after
1980. Not only did this result in real product price
projections being revised downwards by some 25 per
cent, but slow growth or in some cases contraction of
world markets led to serious marketing problems for
the new plants. This, in turn, resulted in low levels of
capacity use, and raised unit costs since the share of
variable costs tends to be low in such industries.
Problems of domestic origin frequently compounded
those of external origin. Cost and time overruns were
commonplace, with the former usually being in the
30-100 per cent range, and the latter sometimes several
years. Many projects may never be completed. The
larger and more complex the project, the greater the
probability of serious overruns [Murphy 1983].
Overruns are not peculiar to developing countries -
the trans-Alaska oil pipeline, for example, came in at
$8 bn versus a projected cost of $900 mn. Like the
large projects, it represented a quantum jump in size
and sophistication relative to its local economy. There
were few precedents, and many unexpected difficulties.
Hastily planned and built, many plants in the oil
countries experienced serious operating problems and
excessively high current costs. One steel complex had
three times the necessary manpower beforesiart-up. In
another plant inexperienced operators caused severe
damage and losses to the tune of hundreds of millions
of dollars.
The net result has been very poor financial and
economic rates of return, with some public manu-
facturing programmes unable to cover even their wage
bills, let alone the costs of other inputs and a return to
capital. Many plants have survived only through the
imposition of taxes, in the form of import restrictions,
on the rest of the economy, a heavy burden on using
sectors. Poor public investments have left governments
facing a difficult choice - to subsidise directly, to
protect and so devolve the cost to other sectors, or to
close down and write off their losses.
The involvement of foreign partners has sometimes
imrroved operating performance. Foreign partners
nave also helped to assure markets. For example,
Indonesia's LNG plants, constructed with heavy
foreign financial and technical involvement, have
benefited from assured markets abroad; Algeria's
larger LNG installations, which are wholly state-
owned, ran at less than half capacity. Marketing has
been a problem for many countries which built plants
far in excess of domestic demand. Clearly, this is
potentially most serious for small countries; in
Trinidad & Tobago, for example, ISCOTT, the state
steel company, had operating costs about 50 per cent
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above those of efficient US minimills, and anti-
dumping charges were successfully brought when it
attempted to export to the vital US market [Auty and
Gelb 1984].
The record also reflects adversely on the process by
which such investments were selected.
The weight attached to resource availability was far
too large relative to capital costs, capacity use and
recurrent cost levels. Profits of such plants are
typically at least three times as sensitive to product
prices or to capacity use as to the charge for the key
natural resource.
'Consensus' and moral hazard in appraisal: Auty
(1986) suggests that consulting firms appraising
projects may be considered to fall into two types. The
first has no apparent financial interest (though others
argue that there are few truly independent project
appraisers), and therefore has little interest in
assessing performance outside a 'range of consensus'
which prevails at the time regarding product outlook,
energy costs, interest rates, etc. If events turn out to be
very different, the firm can justify its assessment with
the argument that 'everyone else was wrong too'. Risk
is therefore not properly accounted for, and sensitivity
analyses performed for such ventures typically do not
address the performance of the project under radically
different market conditions. This means that they do
not consider what the acceptable rate of return needs
to be if things evolve as projected to compensate for
the probability that there will be a major downturn in
markets or large cost overrun.
The second type of appraising firm has a substantial
interest (as a supplier) and may be prepared to take a
small equity stake. This it can easily cover through
sales and fees, however, especially as costs overrun
and its stake shrinks. This introduces a double element
of moral hazard. The appraiser-supplier has a strong
stake in having the project go forward and little
interest in cutting costs once it has started.
(e) Measuring the competition. Appraisals rarely
considered the cost structures of current competitors.
Because of over-optimistic market growth scenarios
they assumed competition with future plants rather
than existing ones. In 1974-76 it was argued that future
plants would be far more expensive because of rapid
inflation in plant costs and negative real interest rates;
in 1980-81 (the other spurt of industrial investment)
over-optimistic projections of energy prices swamped
other considerations.
VI Conclusion
A full assessment of the impact of the decade of oil
windfalls on producers will not be possible for many
years. Much infrastructural investment is slow to
yield; some resource-based investments, even if poorly
timed, may turn out to be profitable should their
markets recover. The record so far suggests, however,
that the benefits have been far smaller than expected.
This has been due partly to the increased uncertainty
which accompanied the windfalls, partly to the
asymmetry of macroeconomic adjustment and partly
to the low quality of much public capital formation.
The exporters would almost certainly have benefited
from saving a larger share of the windfall abroad and
from applying market criteria more thoroughly to
screen investments.
Simulations with a multisectoral general equilibrium
model suggest that private consumption increases by
only about 30 per cent of investment expenditures
when the economy is fairly near full capacity Gelb
1985], via multiplier and real exchange rate effects.
Poor public investments are an inefficient way to
channel oil income to the private sector. 1f greater
saving abroad is ruled out as politically infeasible,
certain countries might fare better by transferring a
greater share of their oil income directly to their
citizens. Another option might have been to use oil
income to encourage non-oil exports. Broad uniform
incentives could compensate exporters for the
appreciated exchange rate but producers would still
need to compete to standards required by world
markets. To be effective, this strategy would require a
very liberal import policy. As oil revenues fell,
devaluations would compensate exporters for the loss
of fiscal incentives and encourage import substitution,
which would probably be easier than rapidly
attempting to develop exports.
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